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Comment
THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF
VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Vertical restrictions are contractual agreements between firms at
different levels of the market as, for example, between a manufacturer and a
retail dealer.' They are to be distinguished from horizontal restrictions
which exist between firms in direct competition with each other at the same
market level.2 Vertical restrictions are used to facilitate distribution of
products or services through contracts between manufacturers and other
independent businesses that engage in wholesale or retail selling.' There are
a variety of vertical restrictions which do not involve resale price
maintenance,4 but rather represent manufacturer imposed control over the
1. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND
COMPETITION 2 (Monograph No. 2, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA MONOGRAPH].
2. Id. at 43-44. Horizontal restrictions are governed by an independent body of
antitrust precedent which is much more settled than that regarding vertical
restrictions. For a discussion of horizontal restraints, see Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Bork II].
Although horizontal restrictions will not be discussed in this Comment, it is
important to note that the distinction between vertical and horizontal restrictions is
often unclear. For example, in United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), a
group of 25 small and medium size grocery store chains formed an association. Id. at
598. The association had developed its own grocery brand and acted as purchasing
agent for the members. Id. It also imposed territorial and customer restrictions
governing the members' sale of Topco brand goods. Id. at 601-02. See notes 7 & 8 and
accompanying text infra. However, the Supreme Court refused to treat these
restrictions as vertical since the individual members owned all of Topco Association's
stock and completely controlled its board of directors. 405 U.S. at 609-10. Thus, the
Court held that the restrictions were horizontal and illegal per se, citing wellestablished precedent for this holding. Id. at 608-12, citing United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). See also ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 2-3 n.3.
3. See Keck, Alternative Distribution Techniques - Franchising,Consignment,
Agency, and Licensing, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 177 (1968). In contrast, a firm may
utilize a vertically integrated system of distribution in which it both manufactures
and ultimately distributes its products through its own divisions and employees. Id. at
177.
For a discussion of the view that more firms would integrate vertically if
vertical restrictions were outlawed and that this result contravenes the policy of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 131 (1976), see notes 121-29 and accompanying text infra.
4. Resale price maintenance is per se illegal. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). For a discussion of the state of the law on resale
price maintenance, see ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 71-96.
It is irrelevant whether the price-fixing agreement fixes maximum or
minimum resale prices, as both deprive the independent businessman of the freedom
to sell at prices determined by his own judgment. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
Vertical territorial or customer restrictions of any type are also illegal per se
when they are part of an agreement to fix prices. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). However, the vertical restrictions must be found to

(547)
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territory in which or the customers to whom a distributor5 may sell the
manufacturer's goods. These restrictive contractual clauses may be of the
6
following types:
1. Territorial restriction - promise by the distributor not to sell the
manufacturer's goods outside a specified geographic area or to consumers
residing or having their business located outside that area.'
2. Customer restriction - promise by the distributor not to sell8 the
manufacturer's goods to specified individuals or classes of customers.
3. Location clause - prohibits the distributor from selling the
manufacturer's goods from any location that the manufacturer has not
approved, or from doing business under the manufacturer's name or method
at an unapproved location.9
4. Primary responsibility clause - assigns the distributor a territory
within which he is to concentrate his sales efforts, although neither he nor
other distributors of the same product are prohibited from crossing primary
responsibility territory lines. 10
5. Profit pass-over clause - assigns the distributor a territory in which
it may sell the manufacturer's goods but provides that profits on sales made
outside this territory must, in whole or in part, be turned over to the
distributor in whose territory the sale was made. Crossing territorial lines is
not forbidden."

play an integral part in the resale price-fixing plan. For example, in United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), the Court found that territorial restrictions allowed
Sealy to give "to each licensee an enclave in which it could and did zealously and
effectively maintain resale prices, free from the danger of outside incursions." Id. at
356.
'erritorial restrictions accompanying

and fostering resale price maintenance
may not be justified by proof of other procompetitive or consumer protection effects.
See Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 944 (5th Cir. 1975). See
also United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 373 (1967); Janel Sales
Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968);
Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 417
F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969); Chapiewsky v. G. Heilmann Brewing Co., 297 F. Supp. 33
(E.D. Wis. 1968).
5. As used in this Comment, a distributor is a firm or business that purchases or
consigns goods supplied by a manufacturer and subsequently resells them to retailers
or the general public.
6. See generally Louis, Vertical DistributionalRestraints Under Schwinn And
Sylvania: An Argument For the Continuing Use of a PartialPer Se Approach, 75
MICH. L. REv. 275, 282 nn.33-38 (1977).
7. Id. at 282 n.33.
8. Id. at 282 n.34. Customer restrictions include promises by the distributor not
to sell to certain customers reserved to the manufacturer himself and promises by
wholesalers only to sell to the manufacturer's franchised retailers. See White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 255 (1963).
9. See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 3 n.5. Location clauses are frequently
accompanied by an exclusive distributorship clause wherein the manufacturer
promises not to authorize another distributor to sell its products in an area
surrounding the first distributor's authorized location. Id.
For a discussion of exclusive franchising and the effect on this practice of
declaring location clauses unlawful, see note 172 and accompanying text infra.
10. See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 3-4 n.6.
11. See Louis, supra note 6, at 282 n.37.
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Vertical restrictions have presented an analytical problem for courts
ever since 1963 when they were first brought to the attention of the United
States Supreme Court in White Motor Co. v. United States.'2 Although each
of the aforementioned restraints has a different impact on the market, 13 the
precise economic effect of each limitation has been the subject of
considerable dispute among lawyers, economists, businessmen and the
federal government. 14 The resulting uncertainty regarding the legality of
these restraints and the antitrust analysis applicable thereto, has raised
serious theoretical questions concerning the policy underlying the Sherman
Act 15 and the traditional modes of analysis utilized by courts in deciding the
16
antitrust status of various business arrangements.
On the one hand, vertical restrictions either foreclose or significantly
deter intrabrandcompetition, depending on the form of the restriction. 7 On
the other hand, they may increase interbrandcompetition and have a net
procompetitive effect by improving distributional efficiency.' 8 The dispute
regarding their economic effect has engendered similar disagreement as to
the proper legal standard applicable to vertical restraints.' 9 One view
proposes that vertical restraints be measured under the "rule of reason,"20
12. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). See notes 25-41 and accompanying text infra.
13. One commentator has distinguished between these various market restraints
as follows:
At one end of an imaginary scale there are territorial restrictions and customer
limitations, which like resale price fixing generally bar competition, or some
crucial aspect of it, absolutely; moving along the scale, there are the exclusive
franchises and location clauses, which create significant territorial barriers to
competition but do not explicitly prohibit it; finally, there are clauses providing
for profit pass-overs and areas of primary responsibility, which do not prohibit
intrabrand competition in the first instance, but only seek to 'discourage' it to
one degree or another.
Louis, supra note 6, at 282-83 (footnotes omitted).
14. Compare Bork II, supra note 2, with Comanor, Vertical Territorial and
Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1968).
Primary responsibility clauses were upheld in Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco,
Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973). Similarly, profit passover clauses were upheld in Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assocs., 353 F. Supp. 1143
(N.D. Ill. 1972).
Moreover, vertical territorial and customer restrictions and location clauses
have been held to be governed by the rule of reason. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). See notes 177-85 and accompanying text infra.
Exclusive distributor or franchise clauses limiting the manufacturer's action
have long been considered legal. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc.,
537 F.2d 980, 997 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Elder-Beerman
Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 459 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1972); Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). For a discussion of the interrelationship between location
clauses and exclusive dealerships, see GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc.,
537 F.2d 980, 997-1000 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1976).
16. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965) [hereinafter cited at Bork I].
17. See notes 98 & 99 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 90-96 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 90-96 & 99-100 infra.
20. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). Although § 1 of the
Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint
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while another maintains that these arrangements are clearly anticompeti21
tive and per se illegal.
On the few occasions in which the Supreme Court has been confronted
with vertical restraint cases, the results have been opaque and economically
unrealistic. 22 Recently, however, the Supreme Court handed down a seminal
decision concerning the legality of vertical restraints in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,23 and seemingly embraced the rule of reason

approach. 24 It is the purpose of this Comment to explore the competitive
effects of vertical restrictions and to assess these effects under antitrust law
precedent and policy.
II.

PRE-Sylvania

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND

LOWER COURT INTERPRETATION

A.

White Motor Co. v. United States25

Prior to the White Motor case in 1963, the Supreme Court of the United
States had not been confronted with a vertical restraint case. 26 Vertical
restraint cases in the lower courts were uniformly private antitrust actions
of trade or commerce," 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), it is clear that not every restrictive
business arrangement is illegal under the antitrust laws. Evidence of this fact can be

found in the classic definition of the rule of reason approach formulated by Justice
Brandeis:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind,
to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Therefore, the rule
of reason requires a court or jury to engage in a detailed study of the economic setting
and effects of the restraints brought before it. Id. at 238. This approach has been
severely criticized in the context of vertical restraints. See notes 147-59 and
accompanying text infra.
21. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Per se antitrust
illegality frees a court or jury from the economic analysis mandated by the rule of
reason and is imposed only on "agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Id. at 5.
Because -of the harsh result of the application of a per se rule of illegality,
practices are not condemned as illegal per se until courts become familiar with the
practice and its true economic implications. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs.,
405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-63
(1963).
22. See notes 25-40 & 54-67 and accompanying text infra.
23. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
24. Id. at 59.
25. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
26. Id. at 261.
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and, without exception, the legality of the restraints were upheld. 27 White
Motor involved both territorial and customer limitations.2 8 White defended
on the ground that these restrictions, although foreclosing intrabrand
competition, were necessary for White to remain in the truck selling
market. 29 Furthermore, White maintained that operating its own retail outlet
system would be too costly, and that territorial restraints were efficient
because they forced distributors and retail dealers to concentrate on
interbrand competition rather than competing among themselves.,, The
United States District Court' for the Northern District of Ohio had granted
the Department of Justice's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the
restraints were per se unlawful. 31 The Supreme Court, in an opinion written
by Justice Douglas, summarily remanded the case to the district court for a

27. See, e.g., Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref.
Co., 291 F. 29 (9th Cir. 1923).
Neither the Federal Trade Commission [FTC] nor the Department of Justice
challenged vertical restrictions before 1948. In that year, the Department of Justice
announced that vertical customer and territorial restrictions that barred all
intrabrand competition were illegal per se. See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at
6-7, citing Hearings on H.R. 528, 2688, 6544 before the Subcomm. on Automobile
Marketing Legislation of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 89, 362 (1956). Following this announcement, the Department of
Justice entered into consent decrees in territorial and vertical customer restraint
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Lone Star Cadillac Co., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,
739 (N.D. Tex. 1963); United States v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,
495 (W.D.N.Y. 1962). See generally ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 7.
Immediately prior to the Supreme Court's decision in White Motor, the FTC
applied a rule of reason analysis to several vertical territorial and customer
restrictions cases. See, e.g., Columbus Coated Fabrics Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1500 (1959);
Roux Distrib. Co., 55 F.T.C. 1386 (1959).
28. 372 U.S. at 253. White Motor Company manufactured trucks and sold them to
distributors who resold to retail dealers. Id. at 255-56. The territorial restraints
outlined geographic areas in which both distributors and dealers could sell White's
trucks. Id. The customer restraints prohibited distributors from selling to dealers
unapproved by White and prevented dealers from selling to any customer who was
not a user (i.e., discount retail outlets). Id. White also forbade its distributors and
dealers from selling to certain customers with whom Ahite preferred to deal directly,
allegedly because these accounts were large and required special sales expertise and
management. Id. at 258-59.
29. Id. at 256-57. White contended that the territorial restrictions were utilized for
valid business reasons because they assured White's competitive viability. Id. There
was no assertion, however, that White was a "failing company." Id.
30. For a discussion of the cost and efficiency comparisons that may be drawn
between vertically integrated distribution systems and distribution through contracts
with independent businesses, see notes 120-29 and accompanying text infra. White
further argued that interbrand competition is heightened when the distractions of
intrabrand competition are removed. 372 U.S. at 256-57. Vertical territorial limits
were assertedly necessary to insure adequate sales efforts and market coverage by the
distributors and dealers. Id. For a more detailed analysis of this justification, see
notes 90-100 and accompanying text infra.
31. United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562, 566 (N.D. Ohio 1961). This
summary disposition increased the Supreme Court's uncertainty as to the effects and
conditions surrounding White's restraints of trade, since the Court did not have access
to a trial record. In this connection, the White Motor Court noted the often repeated
doctrine that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in antitrust cases. 372 U.S. at
259.
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full trial, noting that "[t]his is the first case involving a territorial restriction

in a vertical arrangement; and we know too little of the actual impact of
both that restriction and the one respecting customers to reach a conclusion
32
on the bare bones of the documentary evidence before us."

The White Motor Court's refusal to commit itself to either a rule of
reason or per se approach should be and has been read in the context of the
concurring opinion submitted by Justice Brennan and the dissenting
opinion written by Justice Clark. 33 In the former, Justice Brennan
demonstrated that vertical territorial restrictions, although similar to resale
price maintenance and horizontal market division, were actually distinguishable from these per se unlawful practices. 34 Justice Brennan was also
convinced that vertical territorial restraints could be justified, possibly
through proof of their necessity in insuring adequate dealer servicing or in
aiding new manufacturers, new products, and failing companies to gain a
foothold in the market. 35 Finally, Justice Brennan expressed strong
reservations concerning the legitimacy of the customer restrictions imposed
by White. 36 In contrast to territorial limitations, these restrictions suppressed all competition between a manufacturer and its distributors to
secure the most profitable accounts. 37 Without the countervailing encouragement of interbrand competition normally accompanying territorial limitations, Justice Brennan viewed customer restrictions as requiring more

32. 372 U.S. at 261. After reviewing the justifications advanced by White in
support of its use of vertical restraints, the Court briefly outlined the per se and rule of
reason approaches. Id. at 261-62. See notes 20 & 21 supra. The Court was unable to
conclude that these restraints were without any redeeming virtues and could not
determine whether the vertical restraints formed an integral part of the price fixing
which had been found by the district court. 372 U.S. at 260-61. See note 4 supra.
Therefore, the case was remanded for a new trial. 372 U.S. at 264.
33. 372 U.S. at 264 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 275 (Clark, J., dissenting). See
Note, TerritorialRestrictions and Per Se Rules-A Reevaluation of the Schwinn and
Sealy Doctrines, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 616, 619-20 (1972).

34. 372 U.S. at 268-69 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion aimed at developing guidelines for the district court to follow on remand. Id.
As to territorial restraints, Justice Brennan clearly espoused a rule of reason
approach, noting that resale price maintenance and horizontal market divisions were

restrictive of intrabrand and interbrand competition, whereas vertical market
divisions were not. Id.
35. Id. at 269 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan noted that it was also
pertinent to consider whether the vertical restraints employed were the least
anticompetitive means available to the manufacturer to satisfy his business needs. Id.
at 271-72 (Brennan, J., concurring). It was therefore incumbent upon the trial court to
inquire whether alternatives, such as profit pass-over or primary area of responsibility clauses, could be equally as effective. Id.
36. Id. at 272 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan felt that distributors and
dealers could be trained to handle fleet and large governmental customers and that
the customer limitations could be upheld only if the dealers and distributors were
shown to be completely unable to compete with the manufacturer for the forbidden
accounts. Id. at 272-73 (Brennan, J., concurring). Otherwise, White was merely
protecting its own noncompetitive pricing structure for these customers. Id. at 275
(Brennan, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 272 (Brennan, J., concurring). See note 8 supra.
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substantial justification than White's desire to service directly its large
38

accounts.
Justice Clark, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Black, argued that both the territorial and customer restraints were illegal
under the per se analysis, since they admittedly foreclosed intrabrand
competition and could not be justified by any balancing of interbrand
9
procompetitive effects .
Both Justices Brennan and Clark interpreted the majority as holding
that vertical restrictions were to be judged under the rule of reason, rather
than as holding that the Court intimated no opinion as to their legality and
40
had therefore maintained a temporarily neutral position. More significantly, perhaps, as one commentator has noted, "the White Motor opinion
reveals a surprising degree of disagreement on the Supreme Court
eliminatconcerning the very fundamental question of whether agreements
'4
ing competition are justifiable under any circumstances."
B.

Lower Court Interpretation of White Motor

Two Circuit Courts of Appeals rendered decisions in vertical restraint
cases after White Motor. In 1963, the United States Court of Appeals for the

38. Id. at 272-75 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan rejected the three
justifications asserted by White in support of its use of customer restrictions: 1) that
dealers were not qualified to satisfy the sophisticated demands of large customers; 2)
that distributors could not be relied upon to solicit and service government and fleet
accounts; 3) that direct sales by White to reserved customers were necessary for White
to compete effectively with its competitors. Id.
39. 372 U.S. at 278 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark was adamant in
contending that none of White's business necessity defenses were adequate to justify
the restraints. Id., citing United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305
(1956); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 286 U.S. 373 (1911). Moreover, Justice
Clark argued that the application of a different analysis to vertical and horizontal
market division cases was illogical since it was impossible to believe that all of the
dealers and distributors were unaware of the fact that their counterparts were signing
the same contracts. 372 U.S. at 279-80 (Clark, J., dissenting). The contracts benefited
the dealers, the distributors and the manufacturer only if all the dealers and
distributors were subject to similar restraints. Id. See generally Turner, The Definition
of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75
HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).

40. 372 U.S. at 264 (Clark, J., dissenting). See id. at 264 ("we do not intimate any
view on the merits"). See generally Note, supra note 33, at 619-20. See also Sandura
Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825
(7th Cir. 1963).
41. Bork I, supra note 16, at 778. Professor Bork cited White Motor as a prime
example of the Supreme Court's theoretically inconsistent approach to the meaning
and application of the per se and rule of reason formulations. Id. Since the White
Motor majority failed to provide the district court with any guidelines for determining
whether White's vertical restraints were per se unlawful or justifiable, Bork suggested
that the opinion might mean either that only economic considerations were
controlling or that other values, i.e., the importance of the small businessman, may
enter the analysis. Id. On the other hand, Bork argued that Justice Clark's dissent
was based on purely economic factors. Id. Thus, White Motor might represent a
conflict on the Court as to pure economic theory or as to which ultimate values economic or otherwise - should control the per se rule of reason choice. Id.
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Seventh Circuit decided Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC,"2 in which the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) challenged Snap-On's territorial and customer
limitations on its dealers who distributed Snap-On's hand tools out of
mobile, walk-on trucks. 43 The Seventh Circuit, relying on White Motor,
employed a rule of reason analysis and upheld the restrictions. 4 4 Refusing to
accept the FTC's contention that Snap-On's practices should be considered
together as an integrated plan to suppress competition, the court considered
the restraints seriatim. 45 The Seventh Circuit determined that the restraints
were necessary to preserve Snap-On's effectiveness as an interbrand
competitor in a highly competitive industry where adequate sales coverage
of each territory was indispensable. 46 Therefore, the court concluded that the
procompetitive interbrand effects outweighed the intrabrand anticompetitive effects.

47

One year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
pursued a similar line of inquiry in Sandura Co. v. FTC48 and upheld the
territorial restrictions imposed by Sandura on its vinyl floor product
distributors. 49 The court reasoned that since Sandura was a small company

in a concentrated and competitive industry5° suffering severe operating
losses due to product failures,"1 Sandura needed to impose protective
territorial restrictions to induce dealers to handle its products and to expend
capital on advertising which Sandura itself could not afford. 52 Finally, the
Sixth Circuit held that although Sandura had experienced a substantial
strengthening in market power, the vertical restrictions continued to be
53
reasonably necessary to its survival as a viable though small competitor.

42. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
43. Id. at 827. Snap-On assigned geographic territories (sales routes), limited
customers, and restricted its dealers' right to compete for a specified period after they
ceased to be dealers for Snap-On. Id. at 827.
44. Id. at 828, 837.
45. Id. at 830.
46. Id. at 829, 831-32. The court stressed that the anticompetitive effects of the
restraints, even on intrabrand competition, were minimal since no reprisals were
imposed on dealers who sold to outside customers who came into their territories. Id.
at 833. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit was convinced that Snap-On might fail were it
to eliminate its vertical restrictions. Id. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit stated that
consumers were only entitled to the protection afforded by unfettered interbrand
competition. Id.
47. Id. at 833.
48. 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
49. Id. at 849. The FTC had held Sandura guilty of price fixing and had found its
territorial restraints unlawful. Id. at 859. The finding of price fixing was not appealed.
Apparently, however, the Sixth Circuit did not feel that the territorial restrictions
contributed to the resale price maintenance system. Id. at 859-60. These restrictions
consisted of the assignment of "closed territories" in which wholesale distributors
could sell Sandura's products only to retail dealers located within the assigned
territories. Id. at 849. See note 4 supra.
50. 399 F.2d at 850.
51. Id. at 850-51.
52. Id. at 851.
53. Id. at 853-55. The Sixth Circuit did find that Sandura's vertical restraints
foreclosed intrabrand competition, although the court also stated that there was no
"showing of detriment to intrabrand competition." Id. at 858. It is suggested that the
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Sandura and Snap-On clearly indicated that White Motor had been
interpreted as requiring the application of the rule of reason in vertical
restraint cases. Despite this ascendancy of the rule of reason analysis, the
per se rule was soon revived in a derivative form by the Supreme Court in its
next confrontation with vertical restraints.
C.

54
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.

Schwinn was the most comprehensive and definitive Supreme Court
5
statement on the antitrust status of vertical restraints of trade until 1977. 5
Only four years after White Motor, the Schwinn Court formulated a partial
56
per se rule to govern these cases.
Schwinn was a bicycle manufacturer which had experienced a
57
substantial decline in its market share under a prior distribution system.
In order to reestablish its competitive strength, Schwinn implemented a
system of distribution through wholesalers and franchised retailers that
confined retail sales of Schwinn bicycles to franchised retail dealers,
58
handpicked by Schwinn as qualified sales and service representatives.
court meant that the effects on intrabrand competition were insignificant because
"[n]o dealer ... has been subjected to the caprice of his area distributor, and no
distributor is shown to have made unreasonable profits." Id. at 854. One commentator, noting this internal problem in Sandura, concluded that intrabrand competition
was indeed foreclosed. Bork II, supra note 2, at 433-34.
54. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Commentary in reaction to the Schwinn decision has been
extensive and largely critical. See, e.g., Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change:
From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975); Blecher, Schwinn An Example of a Genuine Commitment to Antitrust Law, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 550
(1975); Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review, 1967, 53 VA. L. REV. 1667
(1967); Louis, supra note 6; McClaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions;
Consignments, Suggested Retail Prices and Refusals to Deal, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 137
(1968); Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REv.
595 (1968); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 243 (1975); Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After Sealy and
Schwinn, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1181 (1967): Note, Vertical Territorialand Customer
Restrictions in the Franchising Industry, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 497 (1974);
Note, supra note 33.
55. After Schwinn, the Supreme Court was not confronted with another vertical
restraint case until 1977, when it decided Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
56. 388 U.S. at 379-80. See Louis, supra note 6, at 275 n.3. See also ABA
MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 13-14.
57. 388 U.S. at 367-70. The actual decline in market share was from 22.5% of
national sales in 1951 to 12.8% in 1961. Pollock, The Schwinn Per Se Rule: The Case
for Reconsideration, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 557, 559 (1975). In 1952, Schwinn terminated
its prior method of distribution whereby wholesalers resold to any retailer they chose.
Id. at 559.
58. 388 U.S. at 370-71. Schwinn contended that the competitive pressures of the
bicycle market mandated a special approach, one which stressed the particular
quality and longstanding reputation of the Schwinn brand products. United States v,
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 338 (N.D. Ill. 1965). To achieve this,
Schwinn sought to improve its retail representation, sales, and service. Id. at 338. See
also Pollock, supra note 57, at 559. For a discussion of product differentiation, see
notes 101-17 and accompanying text infra.
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Under this system, Schwinn sold some bikes to wholesale distributors for
resale, others directly to retail dealers by means of consignment or agency
arrangements with distributors, and some under the "Schwinn Plan"
whereby Schwinn shipped the product directly to the retailer and paid a
commission to the distributor who took the order.5 9
The vertical restraints imposed by Schwinn on its retailers were
threefold: 1) retailers were franchised only as to certain locations; 2) they
could purchase Schwinn products only from the distributor located in their
area; and 3) they were prohibited from selling bikes to unfranchised
dealers.6 The vertical restraints applicable to distributors were assigning
each distributor a sales territory and preventing such distributor from
selling Schwinn products to anyone except franchised retailers operating in
61
that territory.
Before the Supreme Court, the Government abandoned the theory of per
se illegality which it had asserted in the district court and instead argued
that these contractual restrictions were illegal even under a rule of reason
analysis.62 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Fortas, stated that it
would follow the suggestion of the Government and the implications of the
White Motor decision by inquiring into the economic background and effects
63
of Schwinn's restraints.
Initially, the Court noted that Schwinn's territorial and dealer
restrictions were not accompanied by a price-fixing arrangement that could
taint the vertical restrictions. 64 Nevertheless, Justice Fortas concluded that
since Schwinn was neither a new nor a failing company, Schwinn could not
justify its restrictive practices by claiming that they were implemented by a
65
legitimate desire to improve its competitive position.

59. 388 U.S. at 370.
60. Id. at 370-71.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 373. Earl E. Pollock, attorney for the defense in the Schwinn case, has
maintained that the Government actually argued for a rule of presumptive illegality.
Pollock, supra note 54, at 598. According to Pollock, the Department of Justice
proposed that the interbrand competitive effects of Schwinn's restrictive practices
should be ignored and that the burden should be placed on Schwinn to rebut the
presumption of illegality. Id. Further, in Pollock's view, the Government argued that
Schwinn could not sustain this burden since it was neither a failing company nor a
new entrant to the market. Id. See notes 150-57 and accompanying text infra.
63. 388 U.S. at 373-74. Interestingly, the Schwinn court cited White Motor as
controlling precedent for the proposition that vertical restraints must be considered
under the rule of reason, and then proceeded to formulate a partial per se rule to test
the legality of these restraints. Id. at 373-74, 379-80.
64. Id. at 373. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois had decided against the Government on the price-fixing charge and the
Government did not appeal. Id. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F.
Supp. 323, 332 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
65. 388 U.S. at 374-75, citing United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253
(1963). With respect to these restraints not accompanied by a price-fixing scheme, the
Court noted:
[A] manufacturer of a product other and equivalent brands of which are readily
available in the market may select his customers, and for this purpose he may
If the
'franchise' certain dealers to whom, alone, he will sell his goods ....
restraint stops at that point - if nothing more is involved than vertical
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With respect to the sales by Schwinn to distributors or dealers for
resale, 66 the Court articulated the following sale-nonsale distinction:
[W]here a manufacturer sells products to his distributor subject to
territorial restrictions upon resale, a per se violation of the Sherman Act
results. And. . . the same principle applies to restrictions of outlets with
which the distributor may deal and to restraints upon retailers to whom
the goods are sold. .

.

. On the other hand, as indicated in White Motor,

we are not prepared to introduce the inflexibility which a per se rule
might bring if it were applied to prohibit all vertical restrictions of
territory and all franchising, in the sense of designating specified
distributors and retailers as the chosen instruments through which the
retaining ownership of the goods, will distribute them to
manufacturer,
67
the public.
Under this analysis, if the manufacturer retained title, risk of loss and all
other indicia of ownership, and the distributor or dealer functioned exactly
as though he were the agent or salesman of the manufacturer, vertical
restraints were to be governed by the rule of reason. 6 Under the rule of
reason, nonsale transaction restraints were to be held reasonable only if
they were unaccompanied by price fixing, were reasonably necessary to
meet competition, and were utilized in a market where other interchangeable
'confinement' of the manufacturer's own sales of the merchandise to selected
dealers and if competitive products are readily available to others, the
restriction[s], on these facts, alone, would not violate the Sherman Act.
388 U.S. at 376 (citation omitted). The continuing validity of this portion of Justice
Fortas' opinion is evidenced by the "veritable avalanche of precedent to the effect
that, absent sufficient evidence of monopolization, a manufacturer may legally grant
such an exclusive franchise .... " GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537
F.2d 980, 997 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
For a comprehensive list of cases holding exclusive franchises presumptively
legal, see ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 21 n.60. For further discussion of
exclusive franchises and exclusive dealerships and their relation to the effectiveness
of other vertical restraints, see note 172 and accompanying text infra.
66. It should be noted that the Court upheld the program known as the "Schwinn
Plan," under which the sales were consignment-type transactions, by applying the
rule of reason analysis. See 388 U.S. at 380-82. See also Pollock, supra note 54, at
579-80.
67. 388 U.S. at 379-80. Justice Fortas stated that vertical restraints imposed on
consignees and agents were justifiable because application of a per se rule of illegality
in these situations would impair the ability of smaller firms to compete and would
encourage vertical integration of the distribution process. Id. at 380. See notes 118-29
and accompanying text infra.
68. 388 U.S. at 380. It has been strenuously argued that the Schwinn Court
intended to create a very narrow exception to its per se rule when it spoke of agency or
consignment transactions. Zimmerman, supra note 54, at 1188-90. Edwin Zimmerman, writing in support of the Schwinn doctrine while he was First Assistant of the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, stressed that the economic units to
which the per se rule would apply were those which were independent in substance
and not form. Id. He described them as "independent economic entities in the
distribution business, whose business decisions on the sale of the products would
reflect functions, investments, and goals which in fact differ from those of the
producer .... " Id. In his view, restraints imposed on these entities were to be
governed by the per se rule, despite the possible "nonsale" form of transactions. Id.
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brands were available and handled by the distributors or dealers in
69
question.
The Schwinn decision has been criticized by numerous commentators,
who are generally in accord regarding the basic analytical problems presented by the Court's reasoning.7 ° As a threshold matter, it has been
questioned whether the Schwinn Court actually constructed a per se rule for
vertical restraints following sales transactions. 7' The Court's statement that
"it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and
confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the
manufacturer has parted with dominion over it," 72 might be expressive of a
per se rule. 73 However, this language might also connote that vertical

restraints in these situations are unlawful only if they stand "without
74
more," i.e., without a valid business excuse.
Assuming, as have the majority of the lower courts, 75 that the Schwinn
Court did fashion a partial per se rule for vertical restrictions, the question
arises as to why the Court placed controlling weight on the distinction
between sale and agency or consignment transactions. 76 While Justice
Fortas' majority opinion justified this distinction as necessary to preserve
"the ancient rule against restraints on alienation," 77 it is suggested that the
resurrection of this "ancient" property law doctrine in the context of a group
of contemporary business practices seems oddly misplaced. 78 Furthermore,

69. 388 U.S. at 381. The Court thus made it clear that it was not establishing a
rule of presumptive legality even as to nonsale transactions. See Zimmerman, supra
note 54, at 1189.
70. See note 54 supra.
71. See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 11-12; Note, supra note 33, at 626-27.
72. 388 U.S. at 379.
73. The following lower courts have so construed the Schwinn Court's language.
See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir.
1976); Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1975); Adolph Coors
Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); Hensley
Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); Eastex Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co., 367 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 522 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 410 U.S. 52 (1973).
74. See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 11-12; Note, supra note 33, at 626- 27.
With reference to this "without more" language, the Schwinn opinion has been
construed as having incorporated the two defenses to the per se prohibition of vertical
restraints suggested by White Motor, i.e., failing company or new entrant status.
Note, supra note 33, at 626-67.
The Department of Justice also recognized the possibility of exceptions to the
Schwinn Court's apparent endorsement of a per se doctrine. ABA MONOGRAPH, supra
note 1, at 11 n.30, citing Hearings on Exclusive TerritorialFranchise Act Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Financeof the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1974). Bruce B. Wilson, then Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, believed that the Schwinn opinion left "some room ... for
consideration of the economic exigencies of particular situations." Id.
75. See cases cited in note 73 supra.
76. See 388 U.S. at 379-80.
77. Id. at 380.
78. Justices Stewart and Harlan specifically dissented from the majority's
dualistic approach to vertical restraints, arguing instead for a uniform rule of reason
approach. Id. at 390-91 (Stewart & Harlan, J. J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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use of the sale-nonsale distinction stresses form over substance and79is overly
simplistic in a world of highly complicated commercial dealings.
The Schwinn decision took a surprising course for much of the antitrust
bar, for it impliedly overruled the White Motor case, despite the fact that the
Court had not attained any added familiarity with the economics of vertical
restraints in the four years between White Motor and Schwinn.80
D.

Lower Court Interpretation of Schwinn

Although most courts have read Schwinn as establishing a per se rule
applicable to all vertical restrictions imposed on distributors or dealers who
buy goods from a manufacturer,8 many others have avoided Schwinn by
formulating various defenses which validate vertical restraints.8 2 One
common defense that has been accepted by a number of circuit courts is that

part). The dissenters were particularly disconcerted by the majority's reliance on the
rule against restraints on alienation. Id. These justices contended that this "ancient
rule" of property law was never a per se rule in itself, but only a prohibition of
unreasonable restraints on alienation. Id. at 391-93 (Stewart & Harlan, J. J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Since Justices Stewart and Harlan
believed Schwinn's contractual restrictions were mandated by business necessity and
were largely procompetitive in effect, the "ancient rule" was inapplicable. Id. See
Pollock, supra note 57, at 563, citing Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 352 (Ch.
1711). In Mitchel, the court stated: "In all restraints of trade, where nothing more
appears, the law presumes them bad; but if the circumstances are set forth, that
presumption is excluded, and the Court is to judge of the circumstances and determine
accordingly; and if upon them it appears to be a just and honest contract, it ought to
be maintained." Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. at 357.
In addition to Justices Harlan and Stewart, many commentators also regard
this property law doctrine as irrelevant to modern commercial life. See, e.g., Baker,
supra note 54, at 537-38; Pollock, supra note 57, at 563-64; Robinson, supra note 54, at
270-71.
79. See Baker, supra note 54, at 538 (form of transaction clearly unrelated to the
economic effects of the restraint).
Moreover, another commentator has noted:
In short, in a modern economy it is nonsense to say that it is none of the
manufacturer's business how his product is marketed to the consuming public;
that once he parts with legal title when he sells to the wholesaler or retailer, he
has lost the right to participate in the marketing of his product to the consumer.
Today's manufacturer not only has that right, but exercises it all the time; and
he does so because he is competing, as he must and should, with manufacturer's
[sic] of rival products and brands.
Elman, 'Petrified Opinions' and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 625, 630-31
(1966).
80. Indeed, the Court had not been confronted with a single vertical restraint case
in the interim. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1967).
Moreover, one commentator suggested that, given the time-table of the Schwinn case
from oral argument to brief filings to decision, the Court could not even have reviewed
the entire Schwinn trial record. See McClaren, supra note 54, at 141-44.
81. See cases cited in note 73 supra.
82. See notes 83-87 and accompanying text infra. Justice Powell indicated in the
majority opinion in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977),
that the Court was well aware of the ingenuity with which some lower courts had
managed to avoid the per se implications of Schwinn. Id. at 48 n.14 (citations
omitted). See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (per se
rule held inapplicable when the restraints can be avoided by a purchaser if he elects to
buy the product at a higher price).
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those vertical restraints that are not "firmly enforced" by the manufacturer
83
are not illegal since they cannot foreclose intrabrand competition.
Another fairly common justification accepted by lower courts has been
that vertical territorial or customer restrictions were reasonably necessary
for the protection of the health or safety of the ultimate users, or for the
preservation of the quality of a particular product. 84 These defenses have not
been universally accepted, however, especially where the vertical restraints
were accompanied by other anticompetitive practices, such as resale price
85
maintenance.
Not surprisingly, the per se rule announced in Schwinn has not been
applied where the form of the transfer of goods from the manufacturer to the
distributor was not a sale. 86 Moreover, some courts, without any rational
basis, have refused to apply Schwinn beyond its factual context of resales by
87
bicycle distributors.
83. See, e.g., World of Sleep, Inc. v. Stearns & Foster Co., 525 F.2d 40 (10th Cir.
1975); Good Inv. Promotions, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891 (6th Cir.

1974); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968); Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
However, reliance on the concept of "firm enforcement" by the manufacturer
may be an unreliable method of determining the legality of vertical restrictions. The
restrictions may be equally effective, and equally anticompetitive, if distributors and
dealers comply through fear of potential sanctions. For example, the Fifth Circuit has
held vertical restrictions per se unlawful where there is evidence of loose contractual
provisions accompanied by circumstances from which it may be inferred that the
dealer or distributor would comply with the manufacturer's vertical restraints. Hobart
Bros. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923
(1973).
Although the Schwinn restrictions were enforced through sanctions such as
termination of the distribution contract, there is no indication that the holding was
based on a finding of firm enforcement. See Note, Vertical Restraints:Enforcement of
Resale Location Restrictions Is A Per Se Violation of Section One of the Sherman Act,
88 HARV. L. REV. 636, 638-39 (1975). Evidence of "firm and resolute enforcement" is
pertinent to the finding of an "agreement" as required by § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Note, supra at 639.
84. See Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970) (court upheld customer restrictions on sales of chemical beauty products for
protection of consumers).
85. See United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 410 U.S. 52 (1973).

In Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975), Coors

argued that its territorial restrictions were used to ensure that its high quality beer
would be carefully preserved by the distributors and to aid Coors in policing the
handling of its beer. Id. at 938. The Fifth Circuit rejected this justification, pointing to
the clear system of resale price fixing which accompanied the territorial restrictions.
Id. at 945. However, the court noted that it was possible that the exception to Schwinn
found in Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970), could be extended to vertical restraints used to preserve product quality. 506
F.2d at 944-45, 947. See note 84 supra.The court cautioned, however, against allowing
the exceptions to Schwinn to engulf the general rule, stating that Schwinn clearly
indicated that the Supreme Court "has set its face against both horizontal and

vertical territorial restrictions." 506 F.2d at 943, 947.

86. See Williams & Co. v. Williams & Co. East, 542 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1976).
87. See, e.g., Venzie Corp.v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309 (3d
Cir. 1975). See also Williams, Distribution and the Sherman Act - The Effects of
General Motors, Schwinn & Sealy, 1967 DUKE L.J. 732, 740.
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III. ECONOMIC
How SHOULD

ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS:

COURTS DEAL WITH THESE BUSINESS
ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS?

As a result of the Schwinn decision, the obvious legal and economic
confusion surrounding vertical territorial and customer restrictions intensified. Those favoring vertical restraints attempted to demonstrate their
necessity in fostering dealer services and investment, stimulating interbrand competition, and helping new firms and products gain entry to a
market.8 8 Those arguing for the per se illegality of these restraints stressed
the necessity of upholding contractual limitations on intrabrand competition to protect the consumer, the independence of the small business firm,
and the free competitive market which the Sherman Act envisions.8 9
A. Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions:
Competitive Effects and Business Justifications
1. Encouragement of Dealer Investment and Maximization
of Dealer Sales Effort and Servicing
Although the assertion is not subject to concrete proof, it is often posited
that vertical restraints offer dealers protection from raiding by other dealers.
Consequently, dealers with a defined exclusive territory are said to be more
willing to market an otherwise untried product, to serve as a dealer for a new
entrant, to invest in advertising and other promotional services, and to
cultivate every account in their territory with maximum diligence 0 The
underlying premise of this argument is that manufacturers should be able to
insulate their dealers from the competitive tactics of other dealers and
thereby intensify interbrand competition.91 The presumption is that if each
dealer is forbidden from selling in other dealers' territories, he will provide
more services in his own area, because he will not fear that another dealer
will "free-ride. '92 Free-riding occurs when one dealer keeps his advertising,
display, and other costs very low and sells to consumers from other
territories who have been drawn to the product through their own area
93
dealer's intense and costly sales efforts.

88. See notes 90-96 and accompanying text infra.
89. See notes 99-100 and accompanying text infra.
90. See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 853, 856 (6th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc. 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See generally Bork II, supra note 2; Pollock, supra note
57; Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public
Policy Standards, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 506 (1965).
91. See Bork II, supra note 2, at 430-33.
92. Id.
93. Id. To avoid this practice, territorial restrictions are imposed to minimize
intrabrand price competition by encouraging all dealers to provide basically uniform
services, incur the same costs and charge the same prices. See Comanor, supra note
14, at 1428-29. By seeking to increase interbrand product competition over intrabrand
price competition, the manufacturer controls competitive forces, a function normally
left to the marketplace. Id.
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Territorial restrictions may also encourage the post-sale service which is
essential to maintain the quality of many products. 94 If the price of the
service is included in the original sales price, a dealer will be reluctant to
provide post-sale service unless he was the dealer who made the original sale
and therefore was already paid for rendering it.95 Also, this method of
pricing has a potential for encouraging a dealer to free-ride on other dealers'
post-sales servicing. 96
Many commentators have disagreed with the theories outlined above
97
because they dispute whether these are the effects of vertical restrictions.
In addition, many feel that the use of vertical restraints to achieve these
effects is fundamentally inconsistent with antitrust policy. 98
Overall, the effectiveness of vertical restraints in encouraging dealer
efforts and servicing is subject to serious question. 99 Where the use of such

94. See Bork II, supra note 2 at 447-48.
95. Id.
96. Id. This argument also applies to customer limitations. Id. If the manufacturer reserves customers to itself because it possesses the expertise necessary to
provide post-sale service, the manufacturer alone would be paid in the sale price for
the service it provided. Id. If other dealers could also sell to these customers, they may
be paid in the original sales price for a post-sale service only the manufacturer could
provide. Id.
Alternative means of avoiding free-riding, such as charging a separate price
for the services, may be undesirable to the consumer who wants a single price
established prior to purchase. Id. See notes 99 & 100 and accompanying text infra.
To illustrate, if a small manufacturer is attempting to enter a concentrated
industry, he arguably should be permitted to protect his dealers only until he achieves
normal profits and recovers his initial costs. See Louis, supra note 6, at 297. If,
however, this manufacturer is attempting to market a unique product capable of
achieving relative immunity from interbrand competition, it is likely that territorial
protections will not be necessary to attract dealers since they will be drawn by the
prospect of high sales levels and profits. Id. at 297-98.
97. See, e.g., Blecher, supra note 54, at 552-54; Comanor, supra note 14, at 1428;
Louis, supra note 6, at 297-99.
98. See Comanor, supra note 14, at 1428-29.
Some commentators who criticize vertical restraints as methods of recruiting
dealers and their capital have noted that the use of such restraints, if permitted at all,
should be limited in light of the needs of the particular manufacturer. Louis, supra
note 6, at 296. As a threshold consideration, it is submitted that in many cases
vertical restrictions will be unnecessary to attract new dealers. Thus, where this
justification is tendered in defense of a vertical restriction, the defendant should be
required to prove that the product and market involved were not such that new
dealers would have been anxious to be one of the first on the scene. Id. at 298 n.117.
For example, a unique product with considerable consumer goodwill would not require
territorial restrictions to draw dealers into the new market. Id. See generally
Comanor, supra note 14.
99. See Comanor, supra note 14, at 1432-33. Another antitrust law scholar has
expressed serious reservations about the utility of subjecting the market to the
artificial constraints imposed by vertical restrictions:
On the issue of the utility of restrictions in encouraging the dealers to
provide special promotion and service, or the importance of customer restrictions
in enabling the manufacturer to preserve the integrity of its own promotional
efforts to stress the distinctive quality of the product, at least two observations
are pertinent. Often the nature of the manufacturer's interest in avoidance of
resale by non-prestigious outlets is cloaked in ambiguity; it may correspond
closely to little other than an effort to avoid the outbreak of "disruptive" price

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss3/6

16

Alfano: The Legal and Economic Status of Vertical Restrictions

1977-1978]

COMMENT

restraints would be effective in this regard, it may be persuasively argued
that the manufacturer should be required to resort to alternative means,
such as financing his dealer's sales campaigns or insisting that his dealers
charge separately for post-sale services in order to prevent free-riding. 10'
2.

Product Differentiation

Closely related to the practice of encouraging dealer services through
the use of vertical restrictions is the concept of product differentiation, for
this is the goal of many manufacturers' efforts to assure extensive dealer
advertising and promotion. 01 Product differentiation is the use of advertis10 2
ing or similar methods to distinguish a product from that of competitors.
This partially insulates the product from interbrand competition and allows
it to achieve a larger and virtually unassailable market share.'03 However, it
is submitted that promotional product differentiation as a means of
0
obtaining market power is inconsistent with the antitrust laws.1 4
competition. Certainly, most discount houses are reputable, if not elegant, these
days, and the asserted damage to the image of a product from sales by such
establishments may be no more than a puncturing of an inflated claim to an
inflated price. Moreover, to the extent that dealer or producer efforts to
distinguish the brand by intensive sales and servicing efforts do enhance the
brand's competitive stance, the nature of this particular type of competitive
enhancement must be reckoned with. The elimination of intrabrand competition
results in a diminution in price competition, interbrand as well as intrabrand. If,
as is too often the case, the manufacturing segment of the industry is
concentrated, the further product differentiation which may be encouraged by
the restrictions - the alleged benefit - serves largely to help transfer
oligopolistic behavior to the distribution level and to encourage interbrand
"product" competition at the expense of price competition. And while genuine
product competition is not to be scorned, the very need for restrictions to secure it
here suggests that it is to be provided in quantity and intensity that the market,
left untrammeled, does not want.
Zimmerman, supra note 54, at 1185.
100. See Comanor, supra note 14, at 1432-33. The practice of supplying both the
product and services for a single joint price has been criticized. Id. at 1430. For
example, it has been posited that providing services and goods for a single price forces
consumers to buy services they would not otherwise demand. Id. Thus, the result is a
higher price than consumers would otherwise be required to pay: "A system of joint
supply leads to the achievement of product differentiation, increased market power at
both the manufacturing and distribution levels, and thereby to both higher
manufacturers' prices and higher dealer markups." Id.
Equally viable and effective means of insuring full market penetration and
conscientious dealer servicing include conditioning the grant of a franchise on the
maintenance of a uniform level of services, imposing areas of primary responsibility
or requiring territorial sales quotas and profit pass-overs. See notes 10 & 11 and
accompanying text supra. See generally Louis, supra note 6, at 301; Zimmerman,
supra note 54, at 1184-85.
101. See Louis, supra note 6, at 301 n.137. The goal of product differentiation is to
protect dealer markups (the difference between the manufacturer's price to the dealer
and the dealer's price to the consumer) so that dealers will have sufficient profits to
reinvest in such services as promotion and maintenance of attractive outlets. Id.
However, there is no guarantee that dealers will not pocket their profits or use them to
foster price competition with other brands. Id.
102. Id. at 280-81.
103. Id.
104. See notes 114-17 and accompanying text infra. In the opinion of many
economists and lawyers, the use of vertical restraints to aid companies in entering
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Vertical restrictions, by insulating dealers from intrabrand competition,
may result in higher dealer profit margins which the dealers may then use
to differentiate the product, decrease interbrand competition, and gain
market power for the manufacturer.10 5 Vertical restrictions may also enable
the manufacturer to draw dealers who will maintain attractive, qualitycontrolled outlets where the unique image of a particular product will be
carefully preserved and promoted. 10 6
new markets, introducing new products, or recovering a lost market share should not
be permitted. See, e.g., Comanor, supra note 14, at 1427-29; Zimmerman, supra note
54, at 1186-88. In the opinion of these economists and lawyers, such manufacturers
should not be given support which they would not receive in the normal course of
supply and demand in an open market. Zimmerman, supra note 54, at 1186-88. If they
lose the competitive battle, neither the consumer nor the market suffers any loss.
However, if the manufacturers are given the support that territorial insulation from
intrabrand competition offers, consumers are forced to pay higher prices to subsidize
this manufacturer's otherwise unprofitable venture. Id. See also Hearings on S.2549
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate JudiciaryComm., 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1088 (1966) (statement of Donald E. Turner).
In rebuttal, other economists have argued that notwithstanding the-presenceof vertical restraints, the free operation of supply and demand is not interrupted, and
consumers do not lose their control over distribution resource allocation. Bork II,
supra note 2, at 473. Ultimately, the decision by the manufacturer to impose vertical
restraints and thus increase dealer servicing is like any other decision to incur costs.
Id. It will not be made unless it contributes to a higher profit, which in turn depends
on consumer response. Id. If the dealer services are unnecessary and ineffective in
drawing customers, the vertical restrictions will not be implemented. Id.
105. See Comanor, supra note 14, at 1426-27; Louis, supra note 6, at 281.
106. See Bork II, supra note 2, at 430-33. This was largely the reason why Arnold,
Schwinn & Company employed vertical territorial and customer limitations. United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). In an attempt to recover a
falling market share, Schwinn tried to stress its prestigious name by insuring that
their bikes were sold only by retail dealers who would concentrate on promoting
Schwinn bicycles and employing high quality marketing and servicing techniques. Id.
at 368-69. If the manufacturer attempts to accomplish this end by selling only to
authorized dealers, it is presumptively legal under Schwinn. Id. at 376. However, the
manufacturer cannot, under Schwinn, prohibit his dealers from reselling to
unauthorized dealers. Id. at 379. See notes 54-79 and accompanying text supra.
Professor Comanor has suggested that manufacturers often wish to avoid
resale to discount houses because they undermine the existing price structure. See
Comanor, supra note 14, at 1426-27.
Since the dealer's and manufacturer's interests are the same when these
customer limitations are employed, it has been persuasively argued that these vertical
restrictions should be treated the same as horizontal restrictions, i.e., as illegal per se.
See generally Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75
How. L. REv. 795 (1962). Significantly, the major distinction many economists find
between horizontal and vertical market division is based on the perceived difference
of interests between the manufacturer and his dealers. Id. at 823-24. Since vertical
restrictions supposedly cannot increase the manufacturer's market share, although
"they can benefit the dealers by eliminating intrabrand price competition, the
manufacturer may employ the vertical restraints to improve the efficiency with which
his products are marketed. Id. However, when the market division is horizontal (based
on agreements between the competing dealers), the only purpose is to eliminate price
competition which is illegal per se. Id. Consequently, it has been asserted that vertical
restrictions and their possibly procompetitive effects are justifiable, whereas
horizontal restraints are not. Id. at 800, 823-24.
This theory is based on a difference in the motivation of the dealers and the
manufacturer. When the manufacturer uses vertical restraints to free his brand, to
some degree, from interbrand competition, his purpose is as anticompetitive as the
dealers' would be in a horizontal arrangement. See Zimmerman, supra note 54, at
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If the manufacturer can prove that his use of vertical restraints is truly
aimed at selecting dealers who will not falsely differentiate the product, but
who will rather reinvest their higher profit margins in efforts to ensure the
preservation of the inherent quality and unique superiority of the product,
the vertical restraints may still not be appropriate. 01 7 There exist less
anticompetitive means than vertical restrictions that are equally able to
ensure and police quality control. For example, the manufacturer may
market his products exclusively through franchised dealers whose contracts
contain minimum quality control requirements under threat of franchise
termination.108

If the manufacturer's goal is truly promotional product differentiation,
09
the use of vertical restrictions to accomplish this result may still be illegal.1
Competition in an industry depends not only on the number and size of the
firms therein, but also on the interchangeability of consumer demand for
products made by these firms. 110 If product substitutability is great, prices
will be lower as manufacturers compete for business. 1 ' Product differentiation liberates a manufacturer from these competitive pressures and permits
him to charge retailers higher prices. 1 2 On the other hand, differentiation
based on inherent product or service superiority is not necessarily a negative
economic influence, for its anticompetitive effect is a trade-off to consumers
for benefits such as product quality and variety. 1 3 In contrast, differentiation of products with no genuine superiority is a process that disrupts the
functioning of the competitive market. 114 Arguably, it should be left to the
market and the consumers to decide whether intrabrand competition should

1184-85. The eventual result and purpose is to raise the manufacturer's price, thereby
increasing both his return and the dealers' mark-ups. See Zimmerman, supra note 54,
at 1184-85. See also Louis, supra note 6, at 280. In this situation, the often futile
inquiry into whP imposed the restrictions is unnecessary, for the effect and purpose
are the same. See Louis, supra note 6, at 280. The difficulties encountered in any
attempt to determine a manufacturer's true motives in imposing vertical restraints
also present an argument for some type of per se rule. Id. But see Bork II, supra note 2,
at 398-405.
107. Compare Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 831 (1970) (health and safety preservation accepted as justification for vertical
customer limitations) with Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 502 F.2d 934 (5th
Cir. 1975) (quality preservation rejected as justification for vertical restrictions
coupled with resale price fixing). See notes 4 & 85 supra.
108. See Blecher, supra note 54, at 553; Louis, supra note 6, at 302 n.142.
109. See Comanor, supra note 14, at 1424-26; Louis, supra note 6, at 281.
110. See Comanor, supra note 14, at 1423-24.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 1424.
113. See id. However, vertical restrictions are arguably unjustifiable, even when
imposed in an effort to enhance or preserve inherent product superiority. See notes 107
& 108 and accompanying text supra.
114. See Comanor, supra note 14, at 1424-25, 1427. Another evil of product
differentiation is the restriction of entry into the market for new manufacturers. Id.
Another commentator has stated:
A new entrant is being assisted in the creation of product differentiation and
a dealer network [by allowing him to use vertical restrictions], the very things
that those already in the market used to create the entry barriers that necessitate
this assistance. Thus, there is the danger that the new entrant will surmount
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exist, or whether it should be eliminated to enable dealers to focus all of their
efforts on interbrand product competition with the goal of differentiating
'
their own brand. 15
This analysis of promotional product differentiation illustrates the
fallacy in the argument that vertical restraints, while eliminating intrabrand competition, encourage interbrand competition.11 6 It is submitted that
the latter is only temporarily increased, for when the product is sufficiently
differentiated, both intrabrand and interbrand competition are elimi117
nated.
3.

Vertical Integration and the Preservation
of Small Business

In addition to the goal of promoting free competition, the antitrust laws
were promulgated to effectuate another social end - the preservation of the
small, economically independent businessman. 1 8 The two goals are

these barriers, join those already behind them, and in the process raise entry
barriers even higher.
Louis, supra note 6, at 297 n.115.
115. See Comanor, supra note 14, at 1426-27. If the manufacturer is permitted to
utilize vertical restrictions at all to encourage dealers to finance high cost services
necessary to gain a market position, the use should be for a very limited time. See
Louis, supra note 6, at 302.
116. For a discussion of this argument, see notes 90-93 and accompanying text
supra.

117. Obviously, the degree of market power enjoyed by a manufacturer will

influence the extent to which his elimination of intrabrand competition will affect
interbrand prices. Therefore, concentration at the manufacturing level necessitates
greater intrabrand competition so as to preclude the manufacturer from obtaining an
even greater retail market share. See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 63-64, citing
Adolph Coors Co., (1973] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,403 (F.T.C. 1973), aff'd, 497
F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
To ensure that the general price structure will be maintained at a sufficiently
profitable level, oligopolists may favor the use of vertical restraints by every other
oligopolist in the concentrated industry. See Baker, supra note 54, at 541.
However, another commentator has stated that the reduction of price
competition and reduction of the number of competing outlets for a manufacturer's
products may be the result of any "marketing program based on selective distribution
rather than random selling." See Pollock, supra note 54, at 599.
118. For a general discussion of this social purpose of the antitrust laws and its
historical background, see ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 27-29. See, e.g., Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 578 n.12 (1972); United States v. Von's
Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
333, 344 (1962). See also C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 19 (1969); H.
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 227 (1-954).

It should be noted that not all economists agree that the preservation of the
small businessman is a goal of antitrust law. For example, Professor Robert Bork has
consistently maintained that per se antitrust rules are deficient because they ignore
the specific economic phenomena underlying business practices and fail to account
for the values served by the antitrust laws in relation to which these practices must be
measured. Bork I, supra note 16, at 777.
The main tradition of antitrust law, which Bork discovers through a detailed
analysis of Supreme Court decisions from the late 19th century to the present, does
not indicate that competition in and of itself is the goal of antitrust law. Id. at 830.
Rather, the policy underlying these decisions is "the maximization of wealth or

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss3/6

20

Alfano: The Legal and Economic Status of Vertical Restrictions
1977-1978]

COMMENT

interrelated to the extent that a deconcentrated market characterized by
numerous, independent decisionmaking firms will most likely lead to
effective competition. 119 Accordingly, it has been posited that the franchising system of distribution which utilizes independent firms instead of
employees of large vertically integrated firms is more consonant with
antitrust policy. 120 The proponents of this argument contend that the per se
prohibition of vertical restrictions will lead to the demise of the franchise
' 121
system by accelerating vertical integration and business "bigness.
However, it is submitted that although the policy favoring small business is
clear, the impact on this policy of a per se rule to govern vertical restrictions
is not.
At least one commentator writing shortly after the Schwinn decision
predicted that vertical integration would increase and noted that, after the
Court's disposition of its case, the Schwinn Company itself resorted to such
integration. 122 These predictions were based on the perceived inefficiency of
other distribution systems, such as the exclusive use of consignment
transactions, which would avoid Schwinn's prohibition. 123 More recently,

consumer want satisfaction." Id. In Bork's view, "competition is the name of a
process, not of an ultimate desideratum, and so implies a further value." Id. at 831.
In adopting this view, Bork believed that courts would be capable of creating
a consistent body of antitrust precedent, for "[iut is only when competition is viewed
as subordinate to the ultimate value of creating wealth that there exists a social
science - that of economics - which courts may properly use to measure the amount
of competition that is desirable ....

[Ilt stops the policy of promoting competition

short of the complete atomization of society." Id. at 832.
The thrust of Bork's argument is that vertical restrictions should be lawful
because their ultimate economic effects go to the maximization of consumer wealth by
promoting distributional efficiency. Id. at 830-32. Since competition alone, outside of
economic considerations of market share and levels of output, is not a goal of
antitrust law, vertical restraints cannot be condemned merely because they foreclose
intrabrand competition. Id. Any restraint of trade which lessens competition but does
not restrict output and increase a firm's market power therefore should be lawful. Id.
The latter effects are, in Bork's opinion, only created by horizontal action. Id.
119. See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 28 n.95.
120. Id. at 27-29.
121. Id. For a discussion of the view that vertical contractural restraints are legal
because a manufacturer could lawfully achieve the same effects by vertically
integrating, see Bork II, supra note 2, at 472. It is important to note that a corollary to
the antitrust policy of preserving small business is the economic freedom of the small
firm to determine its pricing and marketing policies. ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1,
4t 29-31. The exercise of this freedom may include, however, the option of entering
into contractual relationships that restrict a firm's freedom in order to achieve other
efficiencies. Id. These contractual restrictions have generally been judged by a
standard of reasonableness. Id. However, in the area of vertical restrictions, the
Schwinn prohibition of restraints on alienation suggests that such contracts are per
se unlawful, without regard to the degree to which they restrict the small
businessman's independence. Id. See also GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc.,
537 F.2d 980, 1019-22 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Browning, J., dissenting), aff'd, 433
U.S. 36 (1977).
122. See Pollock, supra note 57, at 569-70.
123. See Pollock, supra note 54, at 609-10. It is suggested that the use of agency or
consignment transactions could be viewed as mere forms for what are in substance
sale transactions utilized to avoid the prohibition of Schwinn in violation of the
antitrust law.
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however, commentators have denied that vertical integration has resulted
from Schwinn's per se rule."'
In fact, the efficiency of vertically integrated distribution is questionable
on several grounds. First, integration may threaten a manufacturer with
other antitrust violations under section 2 of the Sherman Act (monopolization) 125 or section 7 of the Clayton Act (integration through merger or
acquisition).12 6 Second, distribution is a low-profit activity, requiring a
managerial staff that is familiar with local problems and able to provide a
high quality level of personal service.1 27 Finally, many manufacturers will
not produce a product mix sufficiently varied to draw consumers to their
128
outlets.
Perhaps the most convincing argument disputing the assumption that
the prohibition of vertical restrictions would encourage vertical integration
is the fact that "bigness" is already a part of American economic life. As one
commentator has aptly stated, "[I]f it is concentration we fear, let us relax.
'129
We already have been eaten.
4.

Economic Summary

Evidently, there is no concurrence of economic opinion as to the effects
and purposes of vertical territorial and customer restrictions. One view
posits that although these restrictions are often legitimate attempts to deal
with compelling problems in the distribution process, they often result in
excessive product differentiation and do not confer any actual benefit upon

124. See, e.g., ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 29-31; Zimmerman, supra note

54, at 1187. See also GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1029
n.32 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Browning, J., dissenting), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Edwin M. Zimmerman, for instance, has noted that the elimination of vertical
restraints would not turn independent distribution systems into a "rat's nest of
chaotic, inefficient, fly-by-night competition." Zimmerman, supra note 54, at 1186. In

his view, vertical integration would therefore not be necessary to achieve efficient
distribution. Id. at 1186-87.
125. 15 U.S.C. §2 (1976).
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). See also Comanor, supra note 14, at 1435-36.
127. Comanor, supra note 14, at 1435-36.
128. Id. See Zimmerman, supra note 54, at 1186. See generally Phillips, Schwinn
Rules and the "New Economics" of Vertical Relations, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 573 (1975).
It has been suggested that a per se rule against vertical restraints will not
only encourage vertical integration by large firms, but will also eliminate small
competitors who are financially incapable of integrating, thereby allowing the "big
ones" to become bigger. See Pollock, supra note 54, at 610-12.
129. Blecher, supra note 54, at 555, citing Keeffee, The Lawyer's Washington What Hath I.T.T. Wrought: A New Poker Game?, 61 A.B.A.J. 877 (1975). As Keeffee
has stated:
So the trend toward corporate bigness has picked up steam in recent years:
110 of the Fortune 500 largest industrials disappeared by merger from 1962 to
1968, and the average number of mergers each year from 1967 to 1969 was 3,605.
From 1950 to 1974 the 200 top industrial firms increased their control over
manufacturing assets from 46 to 66 per cent. And 115 "billion dollar" companies
now have 52 per cent of all the manufacturing assets in our trillion dollar
economy.
Keeffee, supra at 877.
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consumers. 13 Furthermore, the problems in the distribution process may
effectively be minimized by the use of less anticompetitive means.' 3' In
contrast, those on the other side argue that alternative means are less
efficient and more costly, and that vertical restrictions cannot be illegal
since they only achieve contractually what the manufacturer could legally
32
do by integrating his manufacturing and distributional systems.'
Although the policies and theories urged in opposition to vertical
restraints are in many regards more persuasive than those urged in favor of
their use, 133 the absence of any consensus as to the economic desirability of
these restraints argues against a per se rule of unlawfulness. 3 '
B.
1.

Alternative Legal Theories

Per Se Illegality

One of the most compelling arguments in favor of a per se rule of
unlawfulness is that courts are ordinarily capable of applying the rule to
anticompetitive business arrangements without regard to the particular
circumstances involved in each case. 35 Unfortunately, the courts do not
possess sufficient familiarity to utilize a per se rule in the context of
36
controversial practices such as vertical territorial or customer restrictions.
It is submitted that in fact, there are few defensible reasons for imposing a
blanket rule of per se unlawfulness upon the use of such restraints.
One argument advanced in support of a per se rule is that it would bring
some consistency to the law regarding territorial restrictions by dealing with
vertical restraints in the same manner as horizontal restraints. 3 7 Since it is
often impossible to determine whether the restraints are vertical or are
instead the result of concerted dealer pressure on the manufacturer, a per se
rule for both would preclude the necessity for deciding the issue. 38
More compelling and realistic, although somewhat extreme, is the view
that antitrust law is no longer a functional tool for effecting economic
policy. 13 9 This pragmatic approach recognizes that the huge manufacturing
130. See notes 101-03 & 107-17 and accompanying text supra.
131. See Louis, supra note 6, at 305. See also text accompanying note 100 supra.
132. See, e.g., Bork II, supra note 2, at 472; Pollock, supra note 54, at 606-10.
133. See generally notes 107-17.
134. See Note, supra note 33, at 637.
135. See note 21 supra.
136. See Pollock, supra note 54, at 600-01; see also note 32 and accompanying text
supra.
137. See Zimmerman, supra note 54, at 1188; see also note 2 and accompanying
text supra.
138. The difficulty of deciding this issue is enhanced by the fact that often both
dealers and manufacturers desire the use of vertical restraints. See note 106 supra.
But see Bork II, supra note 2, at 405-10. Professor Bork has asserted that dealer
cartels which force manufacturers to impose vertical restraints on their distributors
are the exception rather than the rule. Id. Bork posited that dealers would rarely be
able to enlist the support of a majority of the manufacturer's dealers and would be
unable to police the observance of the restrictions. Id. Furthermore, enforcement
agencies should be able to find at least one dealer who will reveal the true origin of the
restraints. Id.
139. Blecher, supra note 54, at 555-56.
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concerns which dominate our economy are already largely free from
competition due to their size and power and suggests that antitrust law
should instead focus on the protection of the interests of the small
businessman - the distributor. 140 This policy would prohibit the use of
vertical restraints so as to free the distributors from the threat of franchise
14 1
termination if they violate the restrictions.
Finally, it has been convincingly argued that courts are ill-equipped to
weigh the complex economic effects of vertical restrictions. 142 Since these
restrictions indisputably ban intrabrand competition, and the Sherman Act
clearly aims at the preservation of competition, it has been suggested that
there is no need to balance the intrabrand and interbrand effects of these
restraints. 43 A per se rule is therefore appropriate under this approach and
144
would lend predictability and ease of enforcement to the law.
Nevertheless, given the economic uncertainty concerning the ramifications of these restraints on the market, it is submitted that these
considerations of efficiency and policy do not seem sufficiently compelling to
145
support a blanket declaration of illegality as to vertical restraints.
2. Rule of Reason Approach
The rule of reason analysis, while providing businessmen a full
opportunity to justify their practices, would entail a long and complicated
balancing process for the courts in every instance. 146 The variety of vertical
restraints and the fact that they are most often found in combination adds
to the difficulty of utilizing a balancing approach. 47 This, in turn, would
probably result in a majority of defendant verdicts if courts were unable to
determine
14s that the practices were so unreasonably anticompetitive as to be
illegal.

Finally, the rule of reason would result in a flood of litigation as
businessmen and the enforcement agencies tested various restrictions with
the effect that many restrictions would continue for years while the
149
litigation progressed.

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Louis, supra note 6, at 278.
143. See United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253, 278 (1963) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
144. Compare United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253, 278 (1963) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) with Bork I, supra note 16, at 827-31.
145. See notes 90-129 and accompanying text supra.
146. See note 20 supra.
147. See Louis, supra note 6, at 278; Pollock, supra note 57 at 566-67.
148. See Blecher, supra note 54, at 553. One commentator has defined a rule of
reason trial as "a euphemism for an endless economic inquiry resulting in a defense
verdict." Id.
149. See Louis, supra note 6, at 277 n.14 (author noted the increase in vertical
restriction litigation following Schwinn).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss3/6

24

Alfano: The Legal and Economic Status of Vertical Restrictions
1977-1978]
3.

COMMENT

Alternative Legal Approaches

It would seem, therefore, that some other legal standard should be
applied to vertical restrictions. Two such approaches have been suggested.
The first, commonly called a "structural rule of reason" analysis, employs a
presumption of illegality which may only be rebutted by proof of specified
defenses. 150 This approach is based on the premise that vertical restraints
are more anticompetitive than economically beneficial.' However, they
may be procompetitive "when the product market is unconcentrated at the
manufacturing stage and differentiation is weak; or when the producer
restricting its distributors' spheres of operation would otherwise have
52
difficulty gaining or maintaining a foothold in the market."'
The rule of presumptive illegality would apply whenever vertical
territorial or customer limitations were proven to have been imposed and the
manufacturer had any demonstrable degree of market power in the relevant
market or the restraints were designed to prevent price cutting. 53 Once this
requirement was satisfied, the burden would shift to the defendant to prove
that the vertical restrictions are reasonably necessary to preserve customer
confidence in its product; 54 that the product involves some health or safety
risks that are reduced by supervised distribution; or that the manufacturer is
trying to break into the market. 15 Moreover, regardless of the manufacturer's defense, he would also be required to demonstrate that less anticompetitive means would not be sufficient to achieve his goals.5 6 It is submitted
that this approach to vertical restriction litigation offers the advantage of
reducing the harshness of a per se rule, while defining and rendering
57
predictable the rule of reason approach.
150. See Baker, supra note 54, at 543-48. The Government argued for such a rule of

presumptive illegality when it appealed Schwinn to the Supreme Court. See note 62
supra.
151. See Comanor, supra note 14, at 1423-28. For a discussion that this in fact
appears to be the situation, see notes 99-100 & 107-17 and accompanying text supra.
152. Baker, supra note 54, at 543, quoting F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 512 (1970).
153. See Baker, supra note 54, at 545. Proof of market power at the manufacturer
level may be established by showing large market share or by demonstrating a high
level of product differentiation. Id. At the dealer level, although market power is more
difficult to prove, a large market share is similarly an appropriate indicator of market
power. Id. The presumption of illegality may also arise in other situations, such as
where the territorial restraints are accompanied by exclusive dealerships. Id. at 546.
154. Id. In order to preserve the basic presumption of illegality, the acceptable
defenses must be strictly defined. Id. For example, the defense of reasonable necessity
to preserve the good will of a product would be sufficient only where the product was
complex and required extensive servicing. Id. See Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321
F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
155. See Baker, supra note 54, at 546-47.
156. Id. at 545. A similar structural rule of reason approach based on a
presumption of illegality has been adopted in the "tie-in" area of antitrust law with
small business and good will protection defenses being recognized by the courts. Id.,
citing United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per
curiam, 356 U.S. 567 (1961).
157. The presumptive illegality approach has been criticized as overly simplistic
and unresponsive to the "actual performance of specific markets." Louis, supra note 6,
at 307 (footnote omitted). Since the rule of presumptive illegality isolates certain
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The second alternative to the per se or rule of reason analysis is the
partial per se rule. This would forbid the use of vertical territorial and
customer limitations while utilizing the rule of reason to evaluate other
types of vertical restrictions. 158 This approach, however, appears less
effective than the rule of presumptive illegality since vertical territorial and
customer limitations may be justifiable in certain narrowly defined
situations. 15 9
IV. THE Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc. DECISION

A. Factual Background
On June 23, 1977, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down
the Sylvania decision, in which the court summarily overruled Schwinn by
replacing the partial per se approach with a sweeping rule of reason theory
governing all vertical restriction cases. 160 However, it is submitted that the
Court failed to resolve the conflicts outlined above and therefore the actual
precedential significance of the Sylvania decision is open to serious
question.
The Sylvania case involved a single vertical restriction - a location
clause,' 6' which was firmly enforced by Sylvania. Under a previous disdecisive factors and limits the number of these factors to preserve predictable and
efficient litigation, the correlation between the final judgment and the actual market
situation is imperfect. Id. at 307-08. Further, there is the problem of choosing the
economic indicia which will be acceptable as proof of business justification for the use
of vertical restraints. Id. at 307-09.
158. Id. at 310. One form of this approach is represented by the Schwinn saleresale rule. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 370 (1967). This
rule would ban the use of vertical territorial and customer restrictions except in cases
where they were used for limited time periods to aid a new entrant or a failing
company. Louis, supra note 6, at 310. Other restraints would remain subject to rule of
reason analysis. Id.
159. See Louis, supra note 6, at 308-09.
160. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
161. Id. at 38. For a definition of location clauses, see text accompanying note 9
supra. In general, location clauses restrict the location from which a distributor or
dealer may resell the manufacturer's product. See note 9 supra. They do not explicitly
restrict the territory in which the distributor or dealer may sell. See text accompanying note 9 supra. In 1942, the Second Circuit upheld the use of location clauses in
General Motors' franchise agreements, finding no unreasonable restraint of trade.
Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 695 (1943). The Second Circuit's decision was followed by every court that
considered location clauses after Boro Hall. See, e.g., Salco Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975); Kaiser v. General Motors Corp., 396 F. Supp. 33
(E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976). Furthermore, in United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), the Supreme Court declined to decide the
validity of dealer location clauses. Id. at 139-40.
Both lower court decisions that had held location clauses unlawful were
subsequently withdrawn. See United States v. Revlon, Inc., 1975-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH)
60,202 at 65,727 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), opinion withdrawn, 1975-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH)
60,583 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The other lower court decision holding location clauses per se
illegal was the original panel decision of the Ninth Circuit in Sylvania itself. GTE
Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 1974-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 75,072 (9th Cir.
1974). This opinion was withdrawn and reversed by the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc.
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tribution system, 162 Sylvania used wholesale distributors to market its
televisions and had allowed these distributors to resell to any dealer they
GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). These courts apparently did not find Schwinn a bar to such
clauses. This was a reasonable assumption since location clauses were permitted in
the final judgment in Schwinn on remand. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
291 F. Supp. 564, 565-68 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
The economic debate over the effects of vertical territorial and customer
limitations has occasionally extended to the use of location clauses. For example,
those commentators who did not support the Schwinn partial per se rule had read that
opinion as permitting the use of less restrictive vertical restraints, including location
clauses. See, e.g., Pollock, supra note 54, at 603-05; Zimmerman, supra note 54, at
1187-88. Other economists and antitrust scholars have argued that location clauses
may be as anticompetitive as actual territorial restrictions and are therefore within
Schwinn's prohibition. See Louis, supra note 6, at 290-91. Although only the
geographic location of the outlet is controlled, rather than the freedom of the dealer to
solicit and make sales in any territory, it should be noted that the location clause does
prevent the dealer from making a large part of these sales in distant territories. Id. As
the distance from the authorized location increases, costs of solicitation and shipment
also increase until it is impossible for the dealer to make the distant sale at the high
price he is forced to charge. Id.
Furthermore, it has been argued that a per se rule of unlawfulness for location
clauses would not deny the manufacturer all control over dealer selection. Id. at
288-90. For example, suppose a manufacturer has authorized a particular location
and granted an exclusive dealership there. If the dealer opens an unauthorized outlet
in another dealer's exclusive territory, he
will suffer increasing transportation costs unless the manufacturer is willing to
ship directly to the dealer's customers or to any location it establishes there.
Such direct shipments into the territory would, however, arguably violate the
manufacturer's promise of exclusivity and justify its refusal so to deal;. . . if it is
lawfully implied in the grant of the exclusive franchise ... a distributor's ability
to operate anywhere at wholesale or retail is significantly limited by the cost of
transshipping merchandise from its nearest authorized location.
Id. at 288-89. Nevertheless, even those who oppose a rule of reason approach to
location clauses have recognized that a possible exception should be made for new
retail dealers. Id. at 292-93. The temporary use of location clauses by such dealers is
justifiable in their view because without such protection, the new dealer might fail
under the pressure of invading the market of established dealers selling the same
product. Id.
As one commentator has stated:
Allowing the temporary use of the location clause in nonexclusive new-entry
situations would actually be a minor concession. By definition some degree of
intrabrand competition would exist. Furthermore, during that period the new
entrant would presumably provide the area with sufficient additional capacity or
locational convenience to discourage other dealers from locating there anyway,
unless they undertook to drive it out of business. Barring such a possibility, the
temporary use of location clauses may give the potential new entrant the
assurance to undertake the dealership without significantly harming competition.
Id. at 292 n.94. However, another commentator has refused to accept this justification,
protesting adamantly against any restriction whereby a manufacturer can choose
where, when, or for how long intrabrand competition may proceed freely. See Blecher,
supra note 54, at 554.
162. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 982-83 (9th Cir.
1976) (en banc), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Petitioner, Continental T.V., Inc., was a
franchised Sylvania dealer operating very successful retail outlets at approved
locations. 537 F.2d at 984-85. In 1965, Sylvania franchised another dealer in San
Francisco and approved a location for this store only one mile from one of
Continental's outlets. Id. Continental objected, but the store was established. Id.
Thereafter, Continental cancelled a large order from Sylvania and replaced it with a
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chose. 163 However, Sylvania's market share had dropped to one to two
percent of national sales by 1962 and the market was dominated by huge
companies.5 4 In what it saw as a necessary protection against being
expelled from the market, Sylvania eliminated its wholesalers, sold directly
to only franchised dealers, and employed location clauses. 165 However,
166
Sylvania "made specific efforts to avoid anticompetitive practices."'
Sylvania did not provide exclusive franchises, no dealer could veto
Sylvania's decision to franchise another dealer in a given area, and dealers
could sell to any customer visiting the dealer's outlet. 167 The plan achieved
moderate success, increasing Sylvania's market share to five percent by the
mid-1960's.168
In GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 69 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Sylvania's contractual
restrictions did not foreclose intrabrand competition and were distinguishable from those considered in Schwinn. 70 The court emphasized that the
restrictions utilized in Schwinn - territorial restraints - had clearly
anticompetitive effects, whereas the location clause employed by Sylvania
did not.' 7 ' Stressing the necessary interrelationship between the location
clause and the exclusive franchise, as well as the procompetitive interbrand
effects of the location clause, the court upheld Sylvania's restrictive
72
practices.1

large order from one of Sylvania's competitors. Id. Continental then requested
permission to open another outlet in Sacramento, but Sylvania refused its permission.
Id. Subsequently, Sylvania severely reduced Continental's credit upon receiving
notice from Continental that it was moving Sylvania products to a retail store in
Sacramento in violation of the location clause. Id. at 985-86. Continental then
withheld payments to John P. Maguire & Co., the finance company responsible for
Sylvania's credit transactions with its dealers. Id. Consequently, Sylvania cancelled
Continental's franchise and Maguire brought this suit to recover the money due. Id. at
982-87. The issue of the validity of the location clause was raised in a counterclaim by
Continental against Maguire Co. Id. at 985.
163. Id. at 982.
164. Id. RCA alone held 60 to 70% of the market. Id.
165. Id. at 983.
166. Id.
167. Id.

168. Id. at 984.
169. 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), affl'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).

170. 537 F.2d at 989-90. The Ninth Circuit, in its three-part analysis of Sylvania,
noted that Schwinn had. involved a combination of restraints which, taken together,
totally foreclosed intrabrand competition. Id. In contrast, Sylvania allowed its dealers
to sell to any customer they chose, and by franchising more than one dealer in each
metropolitan marketing area, Sylvania did not foreclose intrabrand competition. Id.
at 990. The Ninth Circuit stated: "Thus a critical and very obvious distinction
between the restrictions in Schwinn and those of Sylvania is that Schwinn involved a

restriction on the locations and types of permissible vendees, while Sylvania only
imposed restrictions on the permissible locations of vendors." Id. (emphasis in
original).
171. Id. at 989-90.
172. Id. at 997. In the second part of its analysis, the court reasoned:

If it is legal for a manufacturer to promise one dealer that he will have the
exclusive right to sell the manufacturer's products within a designated territory,
then obviously it is legal for that manufacturer to keep his promise of exclusivity
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The Sylvania Opinion: Has the Supreme Court Decided
the Legal Status of Vertical Restrictions?

The most significant feature of the Sylvania decision, authored by
Justice Powell, 173 was the acknowledgment by the Court that the reasoning

Id.

by denying other dealers ... the power to sell from retail outlets at unauthorized
locations within the first dealer's exclusive territory.

In the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, the exclusive franchise with a location
clause was actually a preferable method of distribution. Id. at 996. It ensured efficient
market coverage, reduced intrabrand competition instead of foreclosing it, and
preserved the role of the small businessman by discouraging vertical integration. Id.
at 996 n.27, citing Jentes, Permissible Vertical Restraints in Manufacturer Distributor Relations, 8 ABA ANTITRUST L. NOTES 97, 102 (1972). The Ninth Circuit
argued by analogy that the clearly established legality of exclusive dealerships
logically compels the conclusion that location clauses are not per se illegal. 537 F.2d
at 997. For cases holding exclusive franchises legal, see note 14 supra. See generally
McClaren, supra note 54, at 144-45.
The final section of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the location clause was
grounded in the court's perception of the policy of the Sherman Act. 537 F.2d at 1000.
According to the court, this policy would not be served if every slight restraint of
competition was considered per se illegal. Id. Rather, the intrabrand anticompetitive
effects should be balanced against the procompetitive interbrand effects of the
location clause. Id. The court noted that Sylvania remained in the market as a
competitor against other brands, because it was able to regulate its distribution
system and prevent cut-throat intrabrand competition by employing location clauses.
Id. If Sylvania had been eliminated from the market, the result would have been
further concentration of an oligopolistic market and a greater likelihood of eventual
monopolization. Id.
Interestingly, the court indicated in a footnote that it was aware of the
economic controversy generated by vertical restraints and did not espouse either view.
Id. at 1003 n.390. The court felt this neutrality could be adequately served only by
conducting a rule of reason trial. Id. The court recognized, however, that vertical
restrictions and the location clause in particular had some procompetitive effects. Id.
Judge Kilkenny, joined by Judges Browning, Duniway and Wright, dissented
in a lengthy opinion, the main thrust of which was the applicability of Schwinn to
any post-sale restraint on alienation, regardless of whether the restraint involved
vendees or vendors. Id. at 1008-09 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting). Judge Kilkenny asserted
that the location clause had the same economic effect as the territorial restraints in
Schwinn, for the dealer could not realistically be expected to sell to accounts very
distant from his authorized location. Id. at 1009-10 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting). The
dissent also noted that the remand decree in Schwinn, while permitting a location
designation clause, "means only that a manufacturer can specify the location at
which a retailer is the manufacturer's authorized representative and assign areas of
primary responsibility, but that a manufacturer cannot impose resale restrictions
forbidding retailers from selling the manufacturer's product except where the
manufacturer allows." Id. at 1011 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
Judge Kilkenny also disputed the majority's formulation of the relationship
between exclusive franchises and location clauses. Id. at 1013-14 (Kilkenny, J.,
dissenting). Finding the two practices entirely independent of each other, Judge
Kilkenny opined that the manufacturer could adequately ensure effective marketing
solely through use of the exclusive franchise. Id.
Finally, Judge Kilkenny disagreed strongly with the majority's willingness to
balance procompetitive effects in one sector against anticompetitive effects in
another. Id. at 1015 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that free enterprise
meant that no single manufacturer or group of individuals should be permitted to
choose where competition will be encouraged or discouraged. Id.
173. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion joined by four other Justices.
Justice White filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
dissented.
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underlying the Schwinn decision was unacceptable. 174 Unable to distinguish
Schwinn from the case before it, 17 the Supreme Court reconsidered Schwinn
in light of the controversy and criticism that decision generated in the ten
years preceding Sylvania.176 Reviewing the two standard modes of antitrust
analysis, the Court stressed the infrequency with which a per se rule should
be applied and noted that Schwinn represented an unexplained departure
from the rule of reason enunciated in White Motor, decided only four years
177
before.
Noting that Schwinn did not distinguish between vertical restrictions
which merely limited intrabrand competition and those which foreclosed it,
the Court viewed Schwinn's sale-nonsale distinction as an attempt to
balance the intrabrand harm and interbrand benefit which often result from
vertical restrictions. 178 The Sylvania Court found no analytical support for
this distinction, 179 and proceeded to reject the Schwinn Court's sale-nonsale
distinction as unrelated to the actual market impact of vertical restrictions .18

The Sylvania Court's economic analysis of vertical restraints was based
on the recognition of the pragmatically similar effects of location clauses
and outright territorial and customer limitations.181 Vertical restrictions in
general were viewed as reducing intrabrand competition'1 2 in order to
improve distributional efficiency by encouraging dealer investment and
servicing, and by protecting product quality. 8 3 Consequently, the Court
concluded that vertical restrictions may have "economic utility" and thus
could not be readily disposed of by a per se rule of illegality.184 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the Schwinn per se rule should be overruled:
174. 433 U.S. at 57-59.
175. Id. at 45-47. Since title had passed from Sylvania to the dealers upon whom
the location restriction was imposed, the Schwinn partial per se rule was applicable
unless the location clause did not restrict the freedom of those dealers. Id. at 45-46.
However, the dealers' freedom was clearly restricted since they could not sell from
wherever they wished and therefore could not practically sell to many customers and
in many territories distant from their authorized outlet. Id. The location clause,
according to the Court, was indistinguishable from the retail customer limitations
condemned in Schwinn, despite slight differences in their effectiveness in foreclosing
intrabrand competition. Id.
176. Id. at 47-49.
177. Id. at 51.
178. Id. at 52.
179. Id. at 54. The majority summarily dismissed the restraint on alienation
rationale advanced in support of the Schwinn partial per se rule. Id. at 53 n.21. See
text accompanying note 77 supra.
180. 433 U.S. at 54-56.
181. Id. at 54.
182. Id. The Court recognized that location clauses severely restrict the ability of
dealers to exploit the available market due to the practical inability of many
consumers to reach a dealer's location. Id. at 52 n.19.
183. Id. at 54-56.
184. Id. at 57-58. It is important to note that the court refrained from engaging in
a sophisticated economic analysis. However, the Court did evidence a generally
positive attitude toward vertical restraints throughout its brief effect analysis. Id. at
56 n.25. For example, the majority expressed a lack of concern over the product
differentiation which might result from use of these restrictions. Id. Moreover, the
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In so holding we do not foreclose the possibility that particular
applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se prohibition ....
But we do make clear that departure from the rule of reason standard
must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than - as in
Schwinn - upon formalistic line drawing.
In sum, we conclude that the appropriate decision is to return to the
5
rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn.11
C.

The State of the Law after Sylvania

The Sylvania Court laid to rest the controversial Schwinn partial per se
rule and replaced it with the rule of reason applicable to all vertical
restrictions. 186 However, the impact Sylvania will have on lower courts in
their analysis of vertical restrictions or on businessmen in their utilization of
them is unclear. The Court was careful to expressly indicate that some
methods of employing vertical restraints could be so anticompetitive as to be
deemed per se illegal.18 7 The Court, however, provided no guidance for
determining which restrictions might be so anticompetitive, nor did the
opinion explain whether such a per se rule could ever be applied to single
vertical restraint in isolation from others.
It should be noted that the validity of a location clause was the only
issue presented to the Sylvania Court on appeal, and therefore the majority's
brbad rule of reason holding is technically dicta as to all other vertical
restrictions. 18 Moreover, the Court refused to distinguish among the
economic effects of the various restraints.18 9 It is submitted that this lack of
careful analysis led the Court to generalize unjustifiably, since it ignored the
clearly less restrictive impact such vertical restraints as primary responsibility clauses have compared to the use of exclusive territories that are firmly
enforced by the manufacturer. 190
Court stated that such promotional activity may provide the consumer with valuable
information about product availability, price, and services and therefore should not be
eliminated through the imposition of a per se rule. Id.
185. Id. at 59. In his concurring opinion in Sylvania, Justice White objected to the
majority's decision to overrule Schwinn in the context of a case where only a location
clause was involved. 433 U.S. at 59-60 (White, J., concurring). Justice White asserted
that the only holding necessary for the just resolution of this case was a recognition of
the significantly less anticompetitive effects of location clauses as compared to the
Schwinn restraints. Id.
In contrast, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented to the overruling of
Schwinn and would have held the location clause per se illegal, apparently on the
ground that such a restriction was within the Schwinn peruse rule. Id. at 71 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 59.
187. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
188. 433 U.S. at 38.
189. Id. at 46.
190. See notes 10, 100, 108 & 109 and accompanying text supra. In his concurring
opinion, Justice White found significant differences between the economic effects of a
location clause as opposed to vertical territorial and customer restraints. 433 U.S. at
59-62 (White, J., concurring). The concurrence also noted that Schwinn and Sylvania
involved defendants with very disparate amounts of market power. Id. at 63-64
(White, J., concurring). Instead of overruling Schwinn, Justice White preferred to
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Furthermore, since the Court chose to subject all of these restrictions to
a rule of reason analysis, it may be that territorial and customer restrictions
which completely ban intrabrand competition will be declared illegal more
frequently than will those restraints which merely discourage intrabrand
competitive activity. It is important to note, however, that the Court
specifically restored the state of the law to the way it was before Schwinn.191
It may also be significant that prior to Schwinn, and subsequent to White
Motor, the two courts that considered vertical restraints upheld them, even
though they foreclosed intrabrand competition. 192 In addition, the Supreme
Court's reinstatement of White Motor as the controlling precedent in this
area strongly suggests that vertical restrictions will rarely be held to be so
anticompetitive as to justify application of a per se rule. Indeed, as Justice
Brennan's frequently cited concurrence to White Motor strongly suggested,
vertical restraints were often economically necessary and generally
procompetitive practices, even outside of the new entrant or failing company
19 3
situations.
Nevertheless, the Sylvania Court explicitly left open the issue of the
applicability of a per se rule in some vertical restraint cases,194 giving lower
courts the freedom to strengthen their experience and familiarity with
vertical restraints cases through rule of reason trials and then to determine
whether each type of restraint unerringly proved to be severely anticompetitive. Whether lower courts will exercise this option, in light of the clear
implications of the Sylvania opinion favoring the rule of reason, is doubtful.
It is more likely that the lower courts will be confronted with a flood of
vertical restraint cases brought by enforcement agencies and private parties
to test the validity of various combinations of vertical restraints. In the
course of the protracted litigation that will result, it is submitted that courts
will be forced to balance economic theories with which they are incapable of
dealing.' 95 Consequently, it appears that few courts will be capable of
finding a use of vertical restrictions so unjustifiable, so unsupported by
business needs, or so generally anticompetitive on balance as to warrant a
per se rule. 196 While fully consonant with the Supreme Court's attitude as
articulated in Sylvania, it is suggested that this result will be an unfortunate
consequence of the Court's endorsement of the rule of reason. As
demonstrated above, vertical restraints in at least the two most restrictive
forms - territorial and customer restrictions - may have broad anticompetitive effects, may severely misallocate resources, and may rob independent
197
distributors and dealers of the freedom to regulate their own affairs.
refuse to extend it to a "vertical restraint that is imposed by a 'faltering' manufacturer
with a 'precarious' position in a generic product market dominated by another firm."
Id. at 65 (White, J., concurring).
191. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
192. See notes 42-53 and accompanying text supra.
193. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
194. 433 U.S. at 58-59.
195. See notes 147-49 and accompanying text supra.
196. Id.
197. See generally notes 100 & 107-17 and accompanying text supra. In his
concurring opinion in Sylvania, Justice White was particularly concerned with the
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Moreover, similar efficiencies of distribution may usually be achieved
through the use of demonstrably less restrictive means.198
V.

CONCLUSION

It is submitted that the Supreme Court might have more appropriately
limited its holding to a determination of the location clause issue before it.
When a case of vertical territorial or customer limitations did ultimately present itself, a preferable resolution would have been to apply a presumption
of illegality that might be rebutted by specific defenses. 199 This would free
the lower courts from an economic battle they are ill-equipped to arbitrate
and would lend the law of vertical restrictions some degree of structure,
predictability, and ease of enforcement. As the law presently stands,
economists will continue to argue the benefits and drawbacks of vertical
restraints while businessmen will continue to employ them, pending
litigation.
Joanne R. Alfano
fact that vertical restrictions in their most restrictive forms entirely deprive
independent businessmen of their freedom. 433 U.S. at 60-61 (White, J., concurring).
Therefore, Justice White stated that Schwinn's emphasis on preventing restraints on
alienation was well-founded and should be retained as an expression of antitrust
policy. Id. See note 78 supra. Justice White did agree, however, that Schwinn's saleresale distinction was insufficient to protect the freedom of these small businessmen
and suggested that greater emphasis be placed on an economic effect analysis. Id. at
68-69. (White, J., concurring).
198. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 150-57 and accompanying text supra.
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